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Abstract 
In the last 20 years, social capital, has been evoked in several field of social  science 
research and used to explain a vast range of phenomena: political participation, 
institution performance, corruption, economic success of countries and so on.  
Unfortunately, dealing with social capital at a scientific level presents, at least, three 
main problems. First social capital’s definition is still elusive, especially due to its 
multi-dimensional nature. Second, it is a particular form of capital related to a very 
high level of intangibility. Finally, because of lack of suitable data there is neither a 
universal measurement method, nor a single underlined indicator commonly accepted 
by the literature. These are some of the reasons for which social capital measures are 
considered as proxies. By using the density of workers within industrial districts, we 
have constructed an alternative proxy to those that already exist in the literature in 
order to empirically analyse the difference, in terms of economic performance, across 
the Italian regions. The methodology we have applied to derive the index is identical 
to that one used to construct the Putnam’s instrument. Empirical evidence shows that 
our measure does not affect macroeconomic indicators such as investment and income 
per capita. However, it significantly influences unemployment disparities, and the 
level of innovation. 
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Introduction  
According to Coleman (1988) there exist at least three kinds of capital in which 
economic studies are interested: physical, human, and social capital. 
Physical capital is created by changes in materials to form tools that facilitate the 
production. 
Human capital is created by changes in persons that bring about skills and capabilities 
that make them able to act in new ways. 
Social capital is created by changes in the relations among persons that facilitate 
actions. 
Still Coleman (1988) points out that like the other forms of capital, social capital is 
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in the absence 
would not be possible. On the other hand, unlike the other forms of capital, social 
capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not 
lodged in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production. 
In the last 20 years, social capital (SC) has been invoked in several fields of social 
science research and used to explain a vast range of phenomena: political 
participation, institution performance, corruption, economic success of countries and 
so on. Unfortunately, dealing with SC at a scientific level presents, at least, three main 
problems. First, social capital’s definition is still elusive, especially due to its multi-
dimensional nature. Second, it is a particular form of capital related to a very high 
level of intangibility. Finally, because of lack of suitable data there is neither a 
universal measurement method, nor a single indicator commonly accepted by the 
literature. These are some of the reasons for which social capital measures are 
considered as proxies. By using the density of workers within industrial districts, we 
have constructed an alternative proxy to those that already exist in the literature in 
order to empirically analyse the difference, in terms of economic performance, across 
the Italian regions. 
Our proxy, theoretically can solve three main problems related to the Putnam’s 
instrument highlighted by Martin Paldam (2000) which are: the definition of 
voluntary association, the intensity of the contacts and the so called “Beningnness-
weight problem” 
Our finding shows that the index together with the variable of “associational activity” 
is negatively and significantly related to the unemployment rate. While the 
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associational activity does not have any significant influence on innovation, our proxy 
positively affects innovation in terms of the number of patents. These results convince 
us to employ the new proxy in further works especially in connection with what the 
OECD report called “economic well-being”.       
The paper is divided into the following sections. 
Section 1 explains the concept of social capital and its bonding and bridging side by 
also using a general schematic visual model.  
Section 2 presents the so called dark side of social capital by describing the 
Woolcock’ dilemma according to which both “too little” and “too much” social 
capital at any given institutional level can impede economic performance. 
Section 3 describes the different measures employed in the literature in order to 
empirically analyse the economic effects of this particular asset. 
Section 4 focuses on the network and the embeddedness that an industrial district is 
likely to create. The section considers the Italianate industrial districts a la Markusen 
(1996) and explains the concept of the “custom of reciprocal cooperation” developed 
by Dei Ottati (1994). 
Section 5 presents the index and its construction and shows why, according to our 
analysis, the index is likely to avoid the three problems faced by the Putnam’s 
instrument. 
Section 6 develops the empirical analysis first at a descriptive level, and by using 
regressions. The data comes from the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT) and 
are based on year 2001. The analysis is developed through cross sections since the 
data used to derive our index comes from a CENSUS on “Industry and Industrial 
Districts 2001”.  
Section 7 presents the conclusions (At the end of the paper “Appendix A” shows the 
model use by the ISTAT in order to identify the Industrial Districts). 
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1. Social Capital and Definitions 
Within the family of the social capital theorists it is generally accepted that Social 
capital (SC) describes the pattern and intensity of networks among people and the 
shared values which arise from those networks. Greater interaction between people 
generates a greater sense of community spirit. Considering a more simple definition 
used by the Office for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), SC refers 
to "networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-
operation within or among groups".  It may be useful to analyse the key elements 
underlined in the OECD definition. 
Networks indicate personal relationships which are accumulated when people interact 
with each other in families, workplaces, neighbourhoods, local associations and a 
range of informal and formal meeting places 
Shared norms and values are related to shared attitudes towards behaviour that are 
accepted by most individuals/groups as a “good thing”: for example not parking in a 
disabled parking space at a supermarket, recycling etc… 
Finally, Groups are classified considering different characteristics: 
- Geographical groups: people living in a specific neighbourhood  
- Professional groups: people in the same occupation, members of a local 
association or voluntary organisation 
- Social groups: families, church-based groups 
- Virtual groups: networks generated over the internet in chat rooms through 
common interest groups 
Considering these basic terminologies, other definitions have been promoted in the 
literature. I will concentrate on those developed for economic purposes and that refer 
to a common basic idea: social networks are a valuable asset. 
Bourdieu (1983) underlines that “Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. In other 
words, social capital is made up of social obligations and connections within members 
in a group (Lin 2001).   
Coleman (1988) considers that “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions 
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of individuals who are within the structure”. Still Coleman (1990) highlights that 
social capital represents the resources, real or potential, gained from relationships. In 
other words, it is a public good, and as a public good, it depends on the willingness of 
the members of the community to avoid free riding. For this purpose, norms, trust, 
sanctions and values become important in sustaining this collective asset.    
According to Putnam et al. (1993) “Whereas physical capital refers to physical 
objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers 
to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to 
what some have called “civic virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” draws 
attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a network of 
reciprocal social relations. Putnam underlines that “a society of many virtuous but 
isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital”. 
If all the previous definitions describe the concept from different perspectives, it 
seems that they present a common view: it is the interactions between members that 
make possible this social asset to be produced and maintained.  
To this purpose Lin (2001) points out that if social capital may be defined 
operationally as resources embedded in social networks (or ties) accessed and used by 
its members, then two components have to be taken into account. First, social capital 
represents resources embedded in social relationships rather than individuals. Second, 
the access and the use of such resources reside with the members. This implies that 
“ego must be cognitively aware of the presence of such resources in his relations and 
networks”. Only if this particular condition is satisfied the individual can capitalise on 
such ties and resources. 
From this initial presentation two key elements are brought out: the importance of the 
network and the importance of the embedded resources. 
By combining the two elements within a single analysis, Granovetter in 1973 
formalised the concept of “The Strength of the Weak Ties”. Let’s consider an 
individual embedded in a social circle. This individual will tend to interact first with 
other members having similar characteristics or resources (eg. An immigrant builds 
relationships at a first stage with other immigrants speaking the same language and 
coming from the same country). These similarities, of course, will affect the type of 
resources accumulated, for instance information. Within the same circle with the same 
people the information exchangeable will be similar. If individuals need different 
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information they will need to interact with individuals belonging to a different circle. 
In other words, between the two circles (the one to which the initial individual 
belongs and a potential different one) a link or a tie needs to be built. The ties between 
different social circles are called bridges. Using Lin’s words, “without bridges the two 
circles will be independent”.  
The ties within a circle are usually stronger and lead to what in the literature is called 
bonding social capital which identifies closer connections between people with 
similar characteristics (same family, same ethnic group).  
The ties between circles identify more distant and weaker connections (eg. Business 
associates, friends from different ethnic groups, people belonging to different 
companies and enterprises….) and lead to what is called bridging social capital. 
According to Granovetter, these weak ties might contribute to information flows since 
through these bridges a member of a group or association may learn and gain 
information about other groups.        
In the Diagram1 we depict three different circles with different members belonging to 
each of the circle. The arrows identify the connections between two or more 
members. 
The connections between two members belonging to the same circle (e.g.  C-B or L-P 
or T-S) represent bonding connections (or strong ties) while connections between two 
or more different circles (e.g. R-B R-H or M-S or A-N) represent bridges (or weak 
ties). 
An extra feature that can be derived from the diagram 1 is what Lin calls direct and 
indirect ties. Resources can be accessed through direct and indirect connections. A 
and N are directly connected, but M is connected to A through N. A potential scenario 
could be the following. Let’s assume that M is interested in a particular job position 
and that “information X” (for instance extra details, not available in the market, about 
the job position and the interviewer) is the social resource we are considering to 
which M wants to have access in order to increase the probabilities to get that job. M 
starts to use her connections and she immediately contacts N. Unfortunately the direct 
contact does not possess this information but knows someone else, say A, who has it. 
A will represent for M an indirect tie. Hence Lin concludes that social capital extends 
as far as the social networks of the members of the groups..     
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Diagram 1 Bridging VS Bonding Connections 
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Since we have established the importance of networks and of the embedded resources 
there is a postulate that social capital theorists take into account. This is what Lin calls 
the “Strength of Position Proposition”. This postulate indicates that, considering a 
member of a network, the better the position of origin, the more likely it is that this 
member will access and better use the social capital. For instance a better educated 
individual might use his connections in order to achieve higher goals than a less well 
educated individual. An individual with a high income or a high social status might 
have better connections inside the society and achieve higher level of wealth or well-
being relative to an individual with a low social status or low income (it is more likely 
for a lawyer to have a doctor within her friends than for a plumber). 
Considering all the elements we have described so far, social capital as collective 
asset, network and strength of position, we can now assemble in the diagram 2 in 
order to create a general picture of the concept.    
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Diagram 2 General Schematic Visual Model of Social Capital 
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The initial position may represent an advantage in terms of quality connections. 
Because of strong and weak connections through direct and indirect ties a member of 
a group can have access to the embedded resources (e.g. information about a job 
position) as long as this member is aware of the existence of such resources. The 
access to this form of capital can make the individual better off in terms of wealth, 
well-being, power etc… 
 
2. The Dark Side of Social Capital 
Social capital as economic asset has been supported but also criticized by part of the 
literature.  
Arrow (1999) considers that “capital” is something “alienable” and its ownership 
cannot be transferred from one person to another. Therefore, it is difficult – as with 
human capital – to change the ownership of social capital1. 
Some other economists are quite critic, not of the idea and the importance of social 
capital, but particularly on the use that has been made of it in the literature in order to 
explain economic improvement. 
                                                 
1 However, Uzzi (1997) shows that embeddedness made by two agents can be transferred to a third 
agent. In a way, this is like transferring the ownership of social capital 
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Routledge and Von Amsberg (2003) relate social participation to labour turnover. 
More precisely high labour turnover means that people devote more time to work and 
consumption, hence sustaining growth, and less time for social participation. On the 
s 
ity is trusted by the other members, the less his 
easily consider a society made up of individuals, households and small groups 
en the members of a 
 
other hand, reducing labour mobility implies lower labour efficiency and an increase 
in the proportion of trades that are cooperative. 
Also supporters of social capital recognise that this particular asset has its dark side. 
Recalling Putnam’s definition, social capital refers to connections among individuals 
implying elements such as networks and trust. 
Glaeser (in “Social Capital Critical Perspectives” pg113, Baron et al. 2000) define
trust as the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends upon 
the corporative behaviour of others. 
However, according to Fukuyama (2001), even though trust has a general positive 
value, it might represent an opportunity for those who wish to engage in fraud. The 
more an individual inside a commun
actions are monitored by the rest of the community. This implies that the individual 
has greater possibilities if he wants to engage in fraud.  
Moreover, networks might represent a mechanism for both socio-economic inclusion 
and exclusion (Maloney, Smith and Stoker in Social Capital Critical Perspectives. 
Northern Ireland example pg 218). 
The main dilemma pointed out by Woolcock is that: both “too little” and “too much” 
SC at any given institutional level can impede economic performance (Woolcock 
1998).  
We consider it opportune to explain this dilemma in more details, since it implies the 
presence/absence of strong and weak relations within a society. 
We can 
of communities. The trust between the members of a community is called in the 
literature “generalised trust”, while the trust that occurs betwe
community and the institutions running that community is called “institutional trust” 
Woolcock defines “Integration” as process that develops intra-community ties. The 
more intensive the social ties and generalised trust within a given community, the 
higher is the endowment of this form of social capital. On the other side, he defines
“Linkage” as the extra-community networks, in other words, the bridges (using 
Granovveter’s terminology) that can be built between two or more different 
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communities. The dilemma says that “more is not necessarily better”. To this purpose 
Woolcok identifies four cases (Tab. 1).  
 
Table 1 Linkage VS Integration (a la Woolcock)  
High Anomie Social 
Opportunity  
Amoral 
Individualism 
Amoral 
Familism 
Low 
  
Low High 
 
 
LINKAGE 
INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
 First, when generalised trust is mainly present amo  or blood 
latives and absent across different groups then non-developmental reality is likely to 
t the topic of the following chapter. 
                                                
ng family members
re
be present. A situation characterised by a strong social integration and the absence of 
linkage has been called by Edward Bonfield2 (1958) “amoral familism”.  Second, the 
absence of both integration and linkage leads to what Woolcock calls “amoral 
individualism” according to which members are isolated from all forms of cohesive 
and social networks. Third, the presence of the only “Linkage” is associated with 
what he calls “anomie”, where individuals have the freedom and opportunity to 
participate in a wide range of activities but lack the stable community base to provide 
guidance, support and identity (e.g. urban setting and modernisation). Finally, the last 
case is the best possible scenario where both integration and linkage work and 
therefore strong and weak ties together increase social opportunities. 
It is clear that the main weakness of this particular form of capital is that it needs to be 
balanced between its bonding and bridging side. 
A second critical point is related to the methodologies that have been used so far to 
measure this particular asset. This will represen
We anticipate that, because of the large multidimensional nature of social capital, its 
different measures are considered as proxies. Moreover, because of the absence of a 
 
2 Banfield identified “amoral familism” as one of the main causes of Southern Italy’s 
underdevelopment (Sabatini, 2005) 
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common definition and the difficulty in quantifying this asset, to derive a potential 
measure is challenging and not always straightforward. 
 
3. Measures of Social Capital 
thods of measuring SC and testing its ability to 
is still elusive. Coleman, for instance, defines 
between State and Society have to be involved in the analysis. 
                                                
During the last ten years several me
produce relevant economic, social and political outcomes have been used. However, 
there are still problems in accepting results and methods, due in particular to several 
shortcomings underlined by Sabatini. 
First, the definition of social capital 
social capital by its function. Actually, Lin notices that this functional view may 
imply a tautology: social capital is defined when and if it works. The causal factor is 
defined by its effectual factor. By using an example, for actor X kin ties are social 
capital because they channel X to get a better job, while for actor Y, kin ties are not 
social capital because they do not channel Y to get a better job. Recalling, instead 
Putnam’s approach, the associational life represents a crucial element in measuring 
SC. Putnam, in analysing the difference in terms of collective well being between 
Northern and Southern Italy, uses the participation in voluntary organisations as one 
of the main instruments. One of the criticisms that this approach receives is that 
“group experiences might be more pronounced in their impact when members are 
diverse and from different background”. Actually voluntary associations might be 
characterised by groups that are relatively homogeneous in character (Sabatini 2006). 
In other words, a high level of homogeneity within the group is likely to reduce new 
possible bridges between circles. Moreover, Putnam’s analysis3 is based on what in 
the literature is called a “bottom-up” approach, which indicates initiatives that take 
place at the local level without involving government intervention and policies that 
might influence the stock of social capital within a community. Actually, Woolcock 
(1998) considers that a possible solution to the social capital dilemma is to balance 
and integrate the bottom-up approach with the top-down approach where synergies 
 
3 Putnam’s approach, according to John Field (2008) has been influenced and follows the de 
Tocqueville’s thought. In analysing the democracy in the North America, de Tocqueville used the 
terms “Art of association” to describe the Americans’ propensity for civil associations. “The vice of 
modern democracy is to promote excessive individualism that is a preoccupation with one’s private life 
and family, and the unwillingness to engage in public affairs. Americans combated this tendency 
towards excessive individualism by their propensity for voluntary associations (de Tocqueville in 
“Democracy in America” – quoted in Fukuyama 2001)      
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Second, empirical works address different dimensions of SC, hence particular 
measures derive from different sources. There are two main approaches to measuring 
 indirect indicators which lead to confusion about what social 
xies and achieved different outcomes.  
asing the level 
social capital. The first one is to use survey data on the level of trust and civic 
engagement. For this purpose a set of different questionnaires are used. For instance, 
cross-national studies use measures of trust drawn from the WVS (World Value 
Survey) which is based on the question: “generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can be too careful in dealing with people?” The 
possible responses to this question are: “Most people can be trusted”, “Can’t be too 
careful”, or “Don’t know”. The trust indicator is given by the percentage of people 
giving the first answer. One of the problems related to this measure is that it is not 
clear if respondents interpret the meaning of “trust” or “most people” in the same way 
across countries, cultures and times (ages) (OECD 2001). The second approach is to 
conduct a census of groups and group memberships in a given society. On top of the 
problems discussed relative to Putnam’s analysis, Narayan and Cassidy underline that 
measures that use associations are generally partial since they do not include 
characteristics of these organisations. In other words, many different types of 
organisations are put into the same set without considering that some of them may 
negatively influence the stock of social capital (see Putnam’s Instrument VS our new 
proxy in chapter 5).  
The third shortcoming pointed out by Sabatini is that some measures of social capital 
are derived by using
capital is and what its outcomes are, and what the relationship between SC and its 
outcomes may be. According to the previous definitions, social capital represents the 
social resources emebedded in connections. This implies that norms of reciprocity and 
trust are important in order to maintain and maybe increase the stock of this particular 
asset. However, it is important to distinguish between elements such as trust and 
norms from social capital. It should not be assumed that they are all alternative forms 
of SC, or are defined by one another (Lin 2001). For instance, Woolcock stresses the 
idea that trust might represent a measure of social capital but it definitively does not 
represent social capital per se. 
For completeness we want to briefly present a few examples of empirical works each 
of which has used different pro
Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2004) relate social capital to financial development. The 
main idea is that social capital improves economic efficiency by incre
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of trust. Since financial contracts are the ultimate trust-intensive contracts, SC should 
have major effects on the development of financial markets. The authors measure 
social capital through blood donation and electoral participation, claiming that both 
measures are driven only by social pressure and internal norms (fundamental 
components of social capital). The result is a positive and significant relationship 
between SC and financial development. The only problem is still based on the fact 
that using indirect indicators leads to confusion between the concept of social capital 
and its outcomes. 
Sabatini (2005) focuses his studies on the structural components of social capital 
identified with social networks. Contrary to Putnam he considers the 
y consider how different dimensions of social capital (generalised 
ration on economic performance across 29 markets. They find 
ot affect aggregate measures of 
multidimensionality of each type of social network. Empirical evidence shows that 
weak ties positively affect economic performance while strong ties reduce labour 
precariousness. 
De Clercq and Dakhli (2003) analyse the effect of human and social capital on 
innovation. The
trust, institutional trust, associational activities and norms of civic behaviour) may 
influence the level of innovation in a cross country analysis. The find partial support 
for the positive effect of trust and associational activity on innovation. On the other 
hand they find negative relationship between norms of civic behaviour and one of the 
innovation measures.  
Knack and Keefer (1997) by using the World Value Survey data analyse the influence 
of trust and civic coope
the two elements to be positively correlated to income and education but they find that 
Putnam’s measure (calculated as memberships in formal groups) is not associated 
with trust of with improved economic performance.  
Casey and Christ (2005) by using Putnam’s index relative to economic performance 
across American States find that social capital does n
output and employment, even though it has a positive and significant influence on 
economic equality and employment stability. 
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4. Industrial Districts between Network and Embeddedness  
s we have seen so far, social capital theorists stress the idea that network and 
 previous 
s developed through extra 
e 
ism that enables actors to coordinate functions and work out problems “on the 
                                                
A
embeddedness represent the framework of social capital. Since in the
chapters we have described different types of relationships involving two or more 
actors within a network, we consider it opportune at this stage to briefly clarify the 
concept of embeddedness. By using Uzzi’s works (1997, 1999) if we consider an 
economic environment and the firms as main actors of this community, then one of 
the concepts used in the literature to understand inter-firm networks is so called 
“Embeddedness”. To this purpose, Uzzi identifies two forms of relationship: the 
arm’s-length relationship based on the “one shot deal” and the embeddedness 
relationship, consisting of a more personal business relationship, or even better, a 
business friendship. The latter has three main components.  
The first component is trust, which is seen by the partners more under a heuristic4 
approach rather than a typical self-interest approach. Trust i
efforts (called “favours”) that are voluntarily given and reciprocated without any 
formal devices used to enforce this reciprocation (e.g. contracts, fines, overt 
sanctions…). Of course, trust can break down in case of repeated abuse by one part. 
Second, fine-grained information transfer which is more than a matter of asset 
specific know how or reducing informational asymmetry between parties, because th
social relationship imbues the information with veracity and meaning beyond its face 
value.  
Finally, joint problem-solving arrangements which indicate a problem-solving 
mechan
fly”. This refers to routines of negotiation and mutual adjustment that flexibly resolve 
problems. The mechanism implies that firms, in an embeddedness relationship, work 
through problems and get direct feedback, increasing learning and the discovery of 
new combinations. The result is a reduction of production errors and an increase in 
innovation. 
 
4 In the analysis of the trust the “traditional” self-interest approach supported by game theory studies is 
not considered the most correct one, especially for this kind of relationship. Instead, according to a 
heuristic approach, the author underlines the predilections to assume the best when interpreting 
another’s motives and actions.  
 15
The industrial districts (IDs) may represent a particular environment in which network 
and embedded resources are maintained and possibly grow over the time and among 
s with particular attention to the so called 
t develop 
its members. We define industrial districts as a local system characterised by the 
active co-presence of a human community and a dominant industry consisting of a set 
of small independent firms specialising in different phases of the same production 
process (Sforzi 2002). Marshall is one of the pioneers who analysed industrial 
districts. Marshallian industrial districts are characterised by small locally owned 
firms that make investments and production decision locally (Markusen 1996). This 
particular cluster of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is integrated within 
the community where it is located. Therefore economic relations are likely to be 
influenced by social relations by facilitating, in this way, the building of a community 
whose elements (individuals, households, firms and local administration) share the 
same system of norms, values and original culture. This, in turn, facilitates the 
creation of a more consistent system of trust within the environment itself. By using a 
Marshallian expression, all the members of this community benefit from the fact that 
“the secrets of industry are in the air”. 
We are going to show the industrial districts scenario through two steps. First, we 
consider Markusen’s analysis of ID
Italianate type. Second we present the concept of what Dei Ottati calls “The Custom 
of reciprocal Co-operation” that he refers to the industrial district scenario.   
Diagram 3 on Marshallian industrial districts (a la Markusen) shows a community in 
which there are ties between members belonging to different companies tha
a system of competition and collaboration. In simple words the scenario depicted in 
the diagram is the following. The ID presents many small companies buying and 
selling from each other for eventual export outside the region. They need to purchase 
raw materials and business services from outside the area (on the left) and they sell to 
external markets (on the right). 
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Diagram 3 Marshallian’s industrial Districts (a la Markusen) 
ble, it appears that the structure of the ID is based on small local companies that 
d quality of the local labour market”. This is 
Industrial 
District 
 
Suppliers
 
Customers 
 
 
Table 2 shows the features of the Marshallian ID and the Italianate Version. From the 
ta
constantly trade among each other and that plan their investments locally. Moreover 
inside the districts the relationships are based on long-term contracts. This identifies 
the ID as a long-term network with long term relationships that help to create an 
environment able to promote inter-firm cooperation (Knorringa and Stammer 1998). 
Conversely, time-limited agreements are only established in order to achieve a 
particular goal within a particular period of time. Using Uzzi’s terminology, the 
relationships inside the districts are more of the type of embeddedness relationships 
rather than arm’s-length relationships. 
Markusen underlines that “what makes the industrial districts so special and vibrant, 
in Marshall’s account, is the nature an
based on two particular characteristics. First, it is very flexible with workers moving 
from a company to another bringing with them, of course, not only the acquired 
knowledge (human capital) but also the previous connections with ex-colleagues or 
workmates (social capital). Second, the workers’ commitments are first with the 
district and second with the firms. This explains why there is a very low degree of 
(out)migration since the individual considers himself first a member of an embedded 
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community endowed with a particular identity and culture, and only secondly a 
worker of a firm.   
 
Table 2 
res of Marshallian and Italianate Industrial Districts (a la Markusen) Featu
Features Marshallian ID Italianate Version 
Prevailing Mraket 
Structure 
Local SMEs Local SMEs 
Economies of Scale Low Low 
Intra-district Trade Highly loped  Highly developed   deve
Key Investments Local decision Local decision 
Buyer-Producer 
Cooperation 
 Important 
Regulation of 
Relationships 
Long-term Long acts  contracts -term contr
Labour Market Internal to the ID highly Internal to the ID highly 
flexible flexible 
Rela l to 
f  f  
tionship Externa
the District 
Low cooperation with 
irms outside the district
Low cooperation with 
irms outside the district
Workers’ Commitment 1st with ID, 2nd with 
enterprises   
1st with ID, 2nd with 
enterprises   
Labour Immigration High High 
L  abour (out)migration Low Low 
Local Cultural Identity Developed Developed 
Sources of Financing and Int D Int D 
Technical Assistance 
ernal to the I ernal to the I
Patient Capital* Exists Exists 
Pe s rsonnel Exchange  High 
Cooperation among 
Competitors 
 High in order to share risk 
and innovation 
Innovation  Disproportionate shares of 
workers engaged in design 
and innovation 
Local Trade Association  Strong presence 
Local Government  Important 
S ) and Guerrieri ) 
n 
 particular characteristic of Marshallian industrial districts is the presence of what is 
ou tween Markusen rce: Integration be (1996 -Pi 000etrobelli (2
* Presence of financial institutions willing to take long-term risks, for the confidence and informatio
they possess 
 
A
called “patient capital”. This indicates local financial institutions, integrated within 
the ID, willing to take long-term risks because of a high level of inside information 
and trust in local firms. 
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The Italianate version presents some extra features. First of all, there is cooperation 
between buyers and producers and among competitors (see Sexenian 1996). This has 
at least two important implications. First, competitor firms share risks making the 
market more stable. Second, the flow of information resulting from the tendency to 
cooperate and the ability to work together have a positive effects on the innovation 
capacity in the area (see Sexenian 1996). As Guerrieri and Pietrobelli point out, most 
of the technological knowledge is tacit, complex and systemic. Therefore frequent and 
informal personal contacts and exchanges represent crucial elements because 
innovation develops. Moreover, unlike Marshallian IDs, the Italianate version seems 
to imply an higher level of associational activities through the local trade associations 
that provide technical support, organise meeting and forums and spread a sense of 
collective spirit. 
The Italianate versions of the industrial districts shows that a system of strong and 
weak connections exists and that it facilitates the accumulation of these types of 
collective assets such as trust and information. However it does not explain the 
dynamic that permits this high level of trust to be so common within an industrial 
district. Dei Ottati describes this dynamic through the concept of what he calls “the 
custom of reciprocal cooperation”. The analysis is based on three initial main points 
(or facts). First, the labour mobility between firms reinforces the reciprocal 
interdependence and favours the perception of the human capital at the local industry 
as a kind of collective property. Second, because of the limited geographical 
dimension of the environment in which an ID grows, the local agents can easily 
observe and remember the past behaviour of the people with whom they have had 
previous business relations. Finally, due to the last point, in case of incorrect 
behaviour, the widespread possibility of punishing by withdrawing the willingness to 
conclude future transactions with them more a social disapproval represents a useful 
grim strategy. Therefore, the “custom of co-operation” (strictly linked with a long 
term network) helps to reproduce trust, reducing the demand for substitutes for trust 
and the need to monitor which, in turn, implies less direct costs (monitoring costs in 
primis) and the possibility to generate distrust. 
The circulation of inside information, together with the relatively high level of trust, 
represents another collective resource of the industrial district (Diagram 4).  
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Diagram 4 Networks and embeddedness related to the Industrial Districts 
                
s we have seen from Markusen’s analysis, high level of mobility facilitates the flow 
l 
Import-export Firms 
 
Subcontractors 
Firms 
Suppliers Buyers 
 
A
of information among members. Moreover, Dei Ottati shows that there also exists a 
high level of what we call here “mutual information” among firms. Dei Ottati 
considers two types of firms that co-exist within an ID. The first type is represented 
by the companies that are generally specialised in buying and selling (or “import-
export”). This means that they possess the information on end-market conditions. The 
second type refers to firms (Dei Ottati calls them “subcontractors”) specialised in 
different phases of the production process that, therefore, possess information on the 
conditions of production. This scenario implies different types of information (about 
the market conditions, and about the production process) hold by different types of 
actors that, in turn, are responsible for different stages of the same “project”. As a 
result this system of mutual information facilitates reciprocal co-operation inside the 
industrial district network by increasing, in this way, the capital of collective assets.  
From the analysis made so far about the IDs we might probably derive a first genera
outcome. A district is a network with embedded resources (information for instance) 
where the connections among the actors (members and firms belonging to the district) 
are used constantly through mutual cooperation which may help to build an 
idiosyncratic system of mutual trust. If this is true, the industrial district may represent 
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a network where the “capital of connections” is crucial not only for the single member 
but for the entire community. 
 
5. Putnam’s Instrument and a New Social Capital Proxy. 
As I mentioned previously, the multidimensional nature of social capital leads us to 
construct measures of this particular asset that are considered as proxies5.  
Information and trust are vital for a network since they represent most of the 
network’s “intangible” resources which might help the society to achieve either 
economic and social outcomes that are tangible (well-being, higher employment rate, 
innovation in terms of patents and products …) or intangible (sense of social security, 
sense of well-being, innovation in terms of tacit knowledge….). If information 
represents the primary resource that an individual or a group wants to achieve through 
the available “capital of connections”, “trust” might be one of the engines that makes 
(at least partially) this system work.  
Recalling Putnam, networks and associational activities are important frameworks 
where social capital can take place and grow. This kind of approach is known in the 
literature as Putnam’s Instrument.  In analysing the difference in terms of governance, 
institutional performance and well-being between Northern and Southern Italy 
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993), Putnam et al. consider the associational life as 
one of the crucial variables (other variables are newspaper readers, electoral turnout, 
preference voting patterns). In simple words, participation in voluntary organisations 
and social associations promotes among the members collective norms and trust 
which is fundamental for the production and the maintenance of the community’s 
well-being. We are going to present the “instrument” by using the formalisation made 
by Martin Paldam (2000).  
Consider a region (or an area) and, hence, consider a population Ai belonging to that 
region. The associational activity inside the region is based on the voluntary 
organisations (VOs) that work locally. The goal is to calculate the density of VOs and 
to consider it as a proxy of social capital. The process is the following. 
Consider the following ingredients: 
 
                                                 
5 Even though measures of physical and human capital are likely to be considered proxies especially if 
we refer to these forms of capital under their functional aspects.  
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Ai where i  = 1, 2, ….., n is the population 
Π  = density of Voluntary Organisations (VOs) which is a proxy of SC (This is 
Putnam’s instrument) 
Two ways of deriving Putnam’s index 
1) by asking people how many organisations they belong to 
2) by asking the organisations how many members they have 
1) = 2): the survey should give the same result. In case there is a difference, it is 
possible that this is due to missing observations or other interesting problems. 
 
First way 
Pi = a person belonging to yi organisations 
 
∑
=
=
n
i
iyN
1
  for    i=1,2,…,n people 
hence 
n
N=Π   
 
 
Second way 
 
The organisation j has zj members 
∑
=
=
m
j
jzM
1
    for j=1,2,…, m organisations 
Hence 
n
M=Π  
 1) = 2) means that 
n
M
n
N ==Π  
Note that in a homogeneous country, Π  may not likely vary much through the 
country. 
Putnam’s index is recognised as one of the principal SC indices for at least three 
reasons. First, it is easy to calculate (it is quite simple to construct). Second, it 
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combines the element of “trust” with that of “cooperation”. Finally, empirical 
evidence shows that it is “significant” (even though mainly at a correlation level), 
proving that there is a positive correlation between SC and economic performance. 
However, the critics from the literature are based on three main problems connected 
with the index. 
First, the definition of VOs. Some voluntary organisations are more business-oriented 
(Bs), some others are government organisations (GOs). Moreover, some of them 
change their status from GOs to NGOs (Non-government organisations) or from Bs to 
NGOs and vice versa creating confusions regarding the sample to use.  
Second, the intensity of the contacts. One of the problems is to weight the index. 
Because several VOs exist with memberships that cost little in terms of times and do 
not demand intensive and frequent contacts, some people, holding a membership, may 
even not remember that they are members. Therefore each VO is weighted by the 
number of contacts that pi has with the organisation. This is not easy to verify or to 
calculate.  
Finally, what in the literature is called the “Benignness-weight problem”. Some VOs 
are clearly non-benign such as violent organisations, criminal and racist organisations. 
They do not provide social benefits for the community (especially considering that 
one of the characteristics of the social capital system is the free exit. This is something 
not allowed in organisations such as the “Mafia” – See Martin Paldam 2000) 
Given the characteristics of the industrial districts, we consider the ID as a particular 
community and the workers inside the districts as members of this community. The 
idea is, therefore, to construct a new index by using the same structure and method 
applied in the Putnam’s one.  
As in Putnam’s instrument we consider a population and the members of the 
associational activities, IDs in our case rather than VOs.  
To construct our index we need to follow few steps. 
First of all, we need to empirically identify this particular type of network.  
The model that has been used to identify the industrial districts within a particular 
area is presented in the Appendix A. This represents the standard model that is used 
not only by the Italian National Institute of Statistics but also in the literature (Russo 
and Rossi 2001, Baffigi, Pagnini and Quintiliani 1997, Sforzi 2002) 
If we consider the Italian national territory (the following chapter presents a 
descriptive analysis of Local Labour Systems and IDs in more details), this is divided 
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into twenty regions with their own “regional government” and administration. In 
socio-economic terms, each region is composed by what are called local labour 
systems (LLS) which indicate territorial groupings of municipalities (comuni) 
statistically comparable such that: 
- Each grouping may only include neighbouring municipalities belonging to no 
other territorial group 
- Each grouping is self-contained, in the sense that residents in each area mainly 
work for local firms, whose head-office is in one of the municipality making 
up the LLS.  
Therefore, according to the empirical definition, IDs are LLS that meet particular 
industrial concentration criteria and, in particular, two conditions need to be satisfied. 
First, the level of employment of small firms operating in the LLS specialised in 
manufacturing activity must be greater than 50% of total employment in the same 
activity at the LLS level. Second, in case there is only one medium sized companies 
in the clusters, then the number of the workers in the small companies has to be 
greater than the 50% of the number of the workers in the medium sized company 
(such that the industrial system is not polarised). 
Following the same structure of Putnam’s index, consider a socio-economic area, for 
instance a region. There exists a population of workers   j = 1, 2,…, m which is the 
sum of all the workers belonging to the Local Labour System of the region. 
We want to know how many workers in the area work for the IDs 
dj industrial district has lj workers 
∑
=
=
m
j
jdL
1
 
Therefore DIND
m
L =  
We want to test if the index is significant in an empirical analysis either from an 
economic perspective or an econometric one 
The idea is that by using this index instead, we might solve, conceptually, the three 
problems related to the Putnam’s instrument. 
The first problem will not occur, since the IDs are business-oriented and based on a 
common structure. Actually, the firms inside the IDs develop together the shape of 
this particular cluster industry according to the local system of values, norms and the 
market in and for which they work. However, the general structure with its system of 
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links is extremely similar from one industrial district to another. In fact, in the 
literature, empirical works, especially at the macro level, do not distinguish between 
industrial districts (Russo Rossi 2001, Baffigi Pagnini Quintiliani 1997). Because of 
this common structure they do not change nature or status as it might more likely 
happen to the VOs considered by Putnam. 
The second problem is solved by the production system of the ID itself. Within a 
district each firm is specialised in one or few phases of the same production and 
because of the system of “mutual cooperation” (Dei Ottati 1994) it does not have any 
incentive in free riding. Moreover, the “membership and the contacts” are represented 
by the work commitments that all the members respect on a daily basis in order to 
maximise the profit of their own firm or, in most of the case, to survive. 
About the third problem, so far it does not seem that the IDs hide or are based on 
“shadow criminal organisations” therefore also this problem is voided. 
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis is based on a descriptive analysis of our index (DIND) and on 
a series of regressions in order to capture the potential importance that the DIND 
might have for the economic performance across the regions (the variables are 
described in the Appendix B). The data set used has been constructed from the “8th 
General Census on Industry and Industrial Districts (2001)”, “General Census on 
Population and Households (2001)” (ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics), 
data at the regional level on a yearly basis in “System of territorial indicator” still 
from ISTAT, data on gross capital formation are drawn from Eurostat data set, as well 
as the data for patent and innovation coming from “ICT Patent Application to 
European Patent Office”.  
As we have already anticipated in the previous chapter, according to the empirical 
definition used by the ISTAT “Industrial districts are local labour systems that meet 
particular industrial concentration criteria”. Before proceeding with the empirical 
analysis of our proxy, we provide a general descriptive picture of industrial districts 
and local labour systems in Italy. We believe that this approach might help to better 
understand the “macro-structure” situation either at the national level or at the 
regional one. 
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 Fig. 1 Local Labour System in Italy 2001 
 
Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
Fig. 1 shows the net of the local labour systems characterising the industrial 
composition of Italy under the geographic perspective. Some of the LLS correspond 
to industrial districts. Fig.2 and fig. 3 depict the distribution of the IDs within the 
countries and across the regions  
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Fig. 2 Industrial Districts in Italy 2001 
 
  
Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
As we can see the distribution of the industrial districts is mainly concentrated on the 
Centre and on the North of the peninsula. Tab. 3 may help in the general analysis. In 
Italy, according to the last Census, there are 156 industrial districts over 686 local 
labour systems.  
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Table 3 Industrial Districts and Local labour Systems per regions 2001 
REGIONS IDs LLS 
 N. Districts Labour 
Units 
N. LLS Labour 
Units 
Piemonte 12 297,034           37  1,652,362 
Valle d'Aosta - -             3  51,568 
Lombardia 27 1,745,042           58  3,920,631 
Bolzano-Bozen - -           16  207,611 
Trento 4 46,814           17  197,612 
Veneto 22 861,546           34  1,896,143 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3 123,244           11  474,146 
Liguria - -           16  537,251 
Emilia-Romagna 13 574,432           41  1,755,422 
Toscana 15 466,494           53  1,375,783 
Umbria 5 61,823           17  294,930 
Marche 27 435,063           33  592,336 
Lazio 2 31,542           25  1,745,432 
Abruzzo 6 96,859           19  396,422 
Molise 2 4,307             9  88,222 
Campania 6 26,177           54  1,267,384 
Puglia 8 144,096           44  940,182 
Basilicata 1 9,927           19  152,103 
Calabria - -           58  399,995 
Sicilia 2 3,236           77  1,034,949 
Sardegna 1 2,085           45  430,072 
ITALIA 156 4,929,721         686  19,410,556 
Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
Italian territory is divided in 20 institutional and physical regions6 each of them with a 
“regional government” provided with the right to marginally employ some 
macroeconomic policies (such as expenditure in public goods, local fiscal policy, 
expenditure in regional investment on different forms of capital and so on). 
The observations drawn by the ISTAT are 21 because of the division of the region of 
Trentino Alto Adige into Bolzano and Trento. We can immediately notice that four of 
the 21 regions do not have industrial districts. Three of these regions are located in the 
North of the country and only one in the South. All of these three regions are located 
near the borders: Liguria in the North-West coast neighbouring with France, the Valle 
d’Aosta neighbouring with France and Switzerland, Bolzano’s inter-land with 
Austria. On the other hand, the region in the South where the industrial districts are 
absent is Calabria, apparently, the poorest economic area of the peninsula.  
                                                 
6 Constitutionally Italy is divided in 20 regions, however the ISTAT decides to split the region Trentino 
Alto Adige into two “sub-regions” called “Province Aoutonome”: Trento and Bolzano because of their 
socio-cultural-economic characteristics (especially Bolzano, historically quite proximity to Austria, 
German language as second official one, higher level of “minority groups” …)  
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Even though three of the “missing regions” are located in the North, properly that area 
presents the highest number of IDs while in terms of geographical concentration 
(number of districts per hectares) the first two regions are Veneto (North-East) and 
Marche (Centre) with respectively values of 0.0354 and 0.0319. The region in the 
South with the highest density of IDs per hectares is Campania, but the value is quite 
far from the previous two (Density IDs = 0.0135). 
Tab. 4 shows an example of ID drawn from the “8th General Census on Industry and 
Services” (2001). More precisely it presents the principal indicators of the industrial 
district of Clusone in Lombardia.   
 
Table 4 Industrial Districts (example) 
IDs = LLS Clusone – Lombardia 
Type of Industrial District = Textile   
Labour 
Units 
N. 
Municipalities 
Geographical 
Extension 
(Km sq.) 
Residents Households Houses 
and 
Buildings 
13,204 20 459,78 37,684 15,261 35,387 
Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
 
The example shows that the district of Clusone is composed by twenty municipalities 
with more than 13 thousands labour units working in the district area. According to 
the ISTAT Census (the table does not show this value that we have derived from the 
“8th General census on Industry and Services Tab. 16), in the district of Clusone there 
is an average of 3.4 workers per local unit, which intuitively  indicates a very high 
percentage of small firms in the area. The average of the other districts is not far from 
that of Clusone       
Returning to the country level discussion, the economic activity in the typical 
industrial district area is mainly manufacturing and it is divided into few sub-sectors 
such as food industry, mechanic textile and so on. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the 
IDs according to the sub-sectors.  
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  Fig. 3 Distribution by type of Industrial Districts 2001 
 
 
 Source “8th General Census on Industry and Services” (2001) 
          
The picture shows that the textile and the sector of house furniture (yellow and 
orange) is present almost in any region. The sub-sector of mechanics is mainly 
concentrated in the North of the country where a higher level of industrialization 
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process has taken place in the last 60 years7. Felice (2006) empirically shows that 
income disparities across the regions increased tremendously between 1891 and 1951 
with the dramatic result of a country divided into a North side richer and more 
developed and the South quite far from the European standard in terms of economic 
performance, and education. Those “variables” definitively improved in the last thirty 
years by reducing this particular asymmetry, but they still do not achieve a sufficient 
level to create a more homogeneous country. In the so called “Italian Work”, Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti attribute these disparities mainly to a significant difference 
between the level of civic engagement in Northern and Southern Italy. They stress the 
idea that the tendency towards civic associations in the North of Italy facilitates the 
creation of dense horizontal networks and many opportunities for the people to “learn 
trust and social norms”.  
In the analysis of the Italianate industrial districts, Markusen (1996) points out the 
presence of long-term relationships not only between different entrepreneurs and 
workers, but also between them and the local institutions. This, indirectly, reinforces 
Putnam’s theory that sees the institutional trust between citizens and local government 
higher in Northern Italy relative to Southern. 
In relationship to Putnam’s theory we use our proxy in order to test if it can help in 
understanding the different economic performance that occurs across the regions.  
We have already described the index in the previous chapter as the concentration of 
the active population belonging to the industrial districts relative to the population 
working for the LLS.  
Tab. 5 presents the summary statistics for the index. The mean value is equal to 0.178 
and its standard deviation is 0.199. It exhibits an excess kurtosis of 0.894, although 
the Jarque-Bera statistic shows that the assumption of normal distribution cannot be 
rejected. A Quantile-Quantile plot – Graph (a) - shows that the distribution is close to 
normal, but again the number of observations cannot help us to extract a consistent 
estimate relative to the distribution of DIND. 
      
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For an accurate analysis about the regional disparities in Italy from the 1861 until the 2001 see 
Emanuele Felice (2006) 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics DIND 
 Mean  0.178326 
 Median  0.153264 
 Maximum  0.734487 
 Minimum  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.198599 
 Skewness  1.148664 
 Kurtosis  3.894424 
 Jarque-Bera  5.317994 
 Probability  0.070018 
 Sum  3.744847 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.788834 
 Observations  21 
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The median derived in the Summary statistics takes into account also the regions 
where the industrial districts are absent. If we consider, instead, only the regions 
where the DIND is greater than zero then the table 6 provides some interesting results. 
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Table 6 
Median = 0.2096 (Umbria) 
 (Ma  Ve  Lo  To  ER  FVG  Abr  Tr ) >  Um >   (Pie  Pu  Ba  Mo  Cam  La  Sar  Sic) 
 
In table 6 we list the regions in descending order with respect to their median (from 
left to right). Umbria is the median region. Marche (Ma) is the region with the 
maximum level of our index (DINDMa = 0.7345) while Sicily (Sic) is the region with 
the minimum level (DINDSic = 0.0031). In terms of geographical distribution, Umbria 
is in the Centre of Italy and, within the group of the regions having positive DIND, 
there is no Southern region whose value is above the median. In the below-Median 
group, Piemonte is the only Northern region with a value below the median. If we 
exclude it then we will have a country divided into two sides which almost 
corresponds to the North and the South. This division is extremely similar to that one 
derived by Emanuele Felice, although he was referring to economic and well-being 
disparities in Italy between 1891 and 2001. In our case we are just considering an 
“artificial” proxy we have constructed and it would be too ambitious to associate a 
preliminary descriptive analysis with Emanuele Felice results. 
The table of correlations (Tab. 7) and the figs. 4, 5 and 6 show the relationship 
between the index and the main macroeconomic variables. 
From the correlation matrix we can see that DIND is positively correlated with export, 
gross capital formation (GKF) and income per capita (YAB). Within this group of 
variables, the highest positive correlation coefficient is with the level of export (r = 
0.395). Considering “labour market variables”, the index is positively correlated with 
the rate of employment (OCC) but not strongly positively correlated with the labour 
productivity (YLU). On the other hand, DIND is negatively correlated with the level 
of unemployment and even a stronger correlation coefficient with youth 
unemployment (UN1) rather than with the general rate of unemployment (UN2). The 
lowest coefficient is with the net import over GDP (NMY) which is around -0.677.     
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Table 7 “Table of Correlations” 
 EXPORT GKF DIND NMY OCC UN1 UN2 YAB YLU 
EXPORT 1 0.859 0.395 -0.653 0.318 -0.291 -0.297 0.428 0.545
GKF 0.859 1 0.375 -0.677 0.185 -0.127 -0.125 0.331 0.544
DIND 0.395 0.375 1 -0.637 0.470 -0.568 -0.539 0.378 0.208
NMY -0.653 -0.677 -0.637 1 -0.572 0.604 0.638 -0.651 -0.643
OCC 0.318 0.185 0.470 -0.572 1 -0.961 -0.950 0.949 0.713
UN1 -0.291 -0.127 -0.568 0.604 -0.961 1 0.990 -0.893 -0.626
UN2 -0.297 -0.125 -0.539 0.638 -0.950 0.990 1 -0.899 -0.651
YAB 0.428 0.331 0.378 -0.651 0.949 -0.893 -0.899 1 0.886
YLU 0.545 0.544 0.208 -0.643 0.713 -0.626 -0.651 0.886 1
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Fig. 6 
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Fig. 6 presents a positive relationship between the index and the level of investment.  
This is in line with Knack and Keefer perception, according to which a higher level of 
social capital within a community should imply higher trust, therefore “Government 
officials may be perceived as more trustworthy and their policy pronouncements as 
thus being more credible. To the extent that this is true, trust also triggers greater 
investment and other economic activity” (Knack and Keefer 1997). In other words, 
societies with higher level of social capital might have stronger incentive to innovate 
and to accumulate physical capital.  
However, in the regressions analysis, DIND does not have a significant coefficient 
either with respect to capital formation or to income per capita.  
The index, on the other hand, seems to provide a significant influence on 
unemployment, and innovation.  
In the regression analysis we first consider few important elements. 
Firstly, only 17 out of 21 regions have industrial districts in their territory which 
means that four regions present an index equal to zero. For this reason we decide to 
include a dummy variable for those four regions by setting DUMMY = 1 when the 
DIND = 0 and DUMMY = 0 otherwise.  
By following empirical works in the literature (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Clercq and 
Dakhli, 2003, Casey and Christ, 2005, Knack, 1999) in our regressions we consider 
not only our proxy, but also a variable that we call “associational activity”. The 
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associational activity is calculated by the proportions of voluntary organisations over 
residents for each region. This should identify the density of voluntary activities and 
the willingness of a group, or community, to have a common goal in terms of what 
Putnam calls “civic virtue”. On the other hand, for our analysis this proxy might 
represent an extra test, since we are able to compare the performance of our proxy 
with the associational activity a la Putnam from which our index took inspiration.  
Actually, as Knack (1999) underlines, the contribution of the “group memberships” is 
quite controversial in the literature. Putnam (1993) believes that associational 
activities intensify a system of horizontal networks able to spread a sense of 
community and therefore trust and higher respect for civic norms and civic behaviour. 
This, in turn, is likely to improve economic performance within the region (or 
country) where this system is developed. On the other side, Olson (1982) emphasises 
the rent-seeking function that group memberships might have. So, instead of an 
increasing horizontal network, these associations may behave as lobbies and follow 
their own interests, maybe in contrast with the needs of the society. In Knack and 
Keefer, associational activity appears to be unrelated to growth and investment, 
giving, in this way, no much support to Putnam’s view. According to De Clercq and 
Dakhli, instead, associational activity is positively and significantly related to 
innovation in terms of R&D expenditure as a share of GNP.  
Our finding is closer to Knack and Keefer results. We found that both “associational 
activity” and DIND are not significant in explaining investment and income per 
capita. However, they have a significant effect on unemployment disparities and 
innovation.  
We have constructed two tables (Tab. 8 and Tab.9) showing regional unemployment 
disparities. More precisely, we consider both youth unemployment and general 
unemployment. 
If we put Italy equal to 1 then the index of each region in the North and in the Centre 
is below this value with the exception of Lazio. In case of youth unemployment 
disparities, the gap between Southern and Northern Italy is tremendous. If this 
variable reflected the expectation of the new labour force, we should say that in the 
North of Italy young people have an expectation that is double relative to their peers 
in the South.    
The scenario becomes even worse if we consider the general unemployment 
disparities (Tab. 9). From this perspective, Campania, Calabria and Sicilia present an 
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index that is more than double with respect to the index for Italy. This means that 
considering that the unemployment rate in Italy in 2001 is 11.5%, in those three 
regions the unemployment rate is, at least, more than 22%  
 
 
Table 8     
Regional Youth Unemployment Disparities 
Pie 0.589 Ma 0.459 
VdA 0.483 La 1.250 
Lo 0.436 Abr 0.902 
Bo 0.171 Mo 1.201 
Tr 0.332 Cam 1.971 
Ve 0.331 Pu 1.439 
FVG 0.415 Ba 1.475 
Lg 0.828 Cal 1.841 
ER 0.372 Sic 1.891 
To 0.593 Sar 1.612 
Um 0.606 ITALY 1 
 
Table 9 
Regional Unemployment Disparities 
Pie 0.544 Ma 0.478 
VdA 0.463 La 1.114 
Lo 0.408 Abr 0.896 
Bo 0.200 Mo 1.187 
Tr 0.340 Cam 2.327 
Ve 0.355 Pu 1.732 
FVG 0.425 Ba 1.584 
Lg 0.734 Cal 2.114 
ER 0.364 Sic 2.289 
To 0.555 Sa 1.870 
Um 0.583 ITALY 1 
 
When we set the regressions (Tab. 10 and Tab. 11), our findings are quite interesting 
especially if we consider that the empirical literature shows that results on the 
relationships between social capital and labour economy are quite controversial. Some 
studies, for instance, (Granovetter 1973, 1995, Holzer, 1998, Montgomery, 1991 et 
al.) indicate that a great percentage of employed workers are hired thanks to their 
direct connections (friends and relatives) and indirect ties (connections possessed by 
their friends and their relatives).  
However, Fontaine (2004) underlines that because people with fewer social contacts 
may have lower opportunities than others. This means that a high density of workers 
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embedded in the social networks may have the effect to rise the unemployment rate 
by consolidating the distance between insiders and outsiders in the labour market.  
 
Table 10 Disparities in Labour Market (Youth unemployment) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant 3.127285*** 
(0.82884) 
3.120656*** 
(0.878902) 
4.073255*** 
(0.949088) 
DIND -1.66625* 
(0.817074) 
-1.85195** 
(0.774932) 
-1.65031** 
(0.565361) 
Dummy -0.17285 
(0.361186) 
-0.05687 
(0.377377) 
-0.05008 
(0.207988) 
Associational 
activity 
-1.75643** 
(0.675905) 
-1.74516** 
(0.658037) 
-1.25102* 
(0.637936) 
ED -0.03651 
(0.021905) 
-0.02314 
(0.029085) 
-0.05078** 
(0.022447) 
GRAD 0.000363 
(0.000516) 
0.000103 
(0.000653) 
-0.00041 
(0.000488) 
FR  -0.00615 
(0.007125) 
 
MOB   -0.05851** 
(0.021885) 
Adj. R 0.614163 0.617206 0.758543 
S.E 0.357 0.355 0.282 
 
Table 11 Disparities in Labour Market (Inter-generations unemployment) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation3 
Constant 4.63568*** 
(1.140855) 
4.62716*** 
(1.187324) 
5.877533*** 
(1.202434) 
DIND -1.96633* 
(1.008224) 
-2.20503** 
(0.942435) 
-1.94541** 
(0.680031) 
Dummy -0.23794 
(0.463133) 
-0.08885 
(0.501705) 
-0.07678 
(0.267717) 
Associational 
activity 
-2.29261** 
(0.83683) 
-2.27813** 
(0.814492) 
-1.62912* 
(0.776683) 
ED -0.07211** 
(0.0302) 
-0.05493 
(0.040441) 
-0.09085*** 
(0.028259) 
GRAD 0.000216 
(0.000648) 
-0.00012 
(0.00081) 
-0.0008 
(0.000569) 
FR  -0.0079 
(0.009353) 
 
MOB   -0.07681** 
(0.028012) 
Adj. R 0.576115 0.57904 0.740889 
S.E. 0.461 0.459 0.360 
 
Tables 10 and 11 present six equations three for each type of unemployment 
disparities we have considered. We regress unemployment on DIND, “associational 
activity”, level of education (tertiary – ED – and degree level – GRAD), fraud and 
intra-region mobility.  Interestingly, contrary to Casey and Christ (2005) our finding 
shows that either the index DIND or the associational activity positively influences 
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the regional disparities in both types of unemployment rates. This seems to be in line 
with the outcomes obtained by Sabatini (2005): in his model, bonding social capital 
together with linking social capital can reduce labour precariousness. If we control for 
regional distrust (regional level of fraud = FR) then the social capital index becomes 
more significant and its coefficient increases. A possible explanation might be that if 
we include distrust within a society then higher ability to cooperate and higher level 
of social capital need to be present in order to achieve the same economic 
performance that occurs without considering elements of fraud. When we include the 
level of intra-region mobility in both of the tables it results negatively and 
significantly correlated with the unemployment disparities, besides the variable 
“education” becomes significant as well. A possible explanation might be related to 
the effect that higher mobility may have on the labour market making it more flexible 
and affecting workers holding at least a sufficient educational level. Moreover, higher 
intra-region mobility might favourite the development of a larger system of weak ties 
within the population that might increase the inside accumulation of capital of 
connections and therefore it might facilitate a more stable labour economy. Actually, 
from equation 1 to equation 2 (in both of the tables), when we include an element of 
distrust, “fraud”, as we have already noticed, a higher level of social capital is 
required (the coefficient of DIND increases). Instead, when mobility is part of the 
equation, the DIND is still strongly significant but with a lower coefficient and the 
associational activity becomes less significant and the coefficient is reduced by about 
0.5 points. This might be due to a higher level of capital accumulation thanks to a 
more flexible mobility of the individuals from a group to another facilitating, in this 
way, the creation of bridges among groups inside the region. However, our results 
need caution in the interpretation, especially, with regard to the Italian contest. To this 
purpose there are at least two elements that have to be taken into account. First, Italy 
is characterised by a rigid labour market with a lack of intermediary bodies (private or 
public) that efficiently may play the search-matching function. This, of course, 
implies on some extent that personal connections represent more a rule rather than an 
option or an added value. Second, the Italian industrial and service system is based 
mainly on small and medium sized enterprises where the human resource sector 
works at a local level and through connections. If this attitude, in a way, might 
“stabilise” the labour market, on the other hand it might also cause inefficiencies in 
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the labour economy (in terms of wage and productivity). Actually, our index does not 
provide any influence on labour productivity and does not affect the level of wage.      
Instead, the fact that the variable of associational activity negatively affects the rate of 
unemployment reinforces Putnam’s theory according to which more intensive 
associational life facilitates economic development. More precisely, civic associations 
can create a dense horizontal network and rise the opportunities for the individuals to 
improve their social and economic position.    
Our analysis tries also to capture the importance of the DIND on innovation. 
Casey and Christ stress on the fact that trust lessens the need for rigid control system 
which enhances idea generation (tight monitoring and control mechanisms reduce 
creative thinking). Trust, then, is not only important for innovation through the 
interactions between individuals but also through inter-organisational corporation. 
Following De Clercq and Dakhli (2003) we measure innovation by considering two 
main dimensions: the number of patents and the investment in R&D over the GDP 
(Tab.11) 
As De Clercq and Dakhli point out, the number of patents capture an important aspect 
of the level of the technological activities since they need to satisfy some crucial 
conditions in order to be qualified for patent eligibility: the invention must be novel, 
useful and exhibit “inventive step” (which means that it is non-obvious). Our measure 
corresponds to the aggregate of patents per habitant. Moreover, it represents a more 
reliable index in terms of innovative products since it implies a legal certification. As 
Ughetto (2006) underlines, during a survey on industrial districts and innovation it is 
likely to deal with a possible wrong perception of the novelty of products and 
processes by firms. In simple words, products or processes could be indeed be “new 
to the firm” but not to the “market”.   
The control variables we use are, except our proxy and associational activity, human 
capital, physical capital, rate of employment in the field of research and development 
and the level of fraud. The reason of the variable “fraud” is related to the fact that 
associational activity and social capital imply elements of trust. Moreover, the 
innovation is a particular sector in which the spread of information has an extremely 
important spill over effect that could likely be undermined if elements of distrust 
within members are perceived. We use then five equations in order to develop our 
analysis and, unlike De Clercq and Dakhli, we find that our index is significant in all 
the regressions while the associational activity does not affect the level of innovation. 
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Table 12 
The Effect of DIND on Innovation 
 Eq. 1 
Patent 
Eq. 2 
Patent 
Eq. 3 
R&Dexp/Y 
Eq. 4 
R&Dexp/Y 
Eq. 5 
Disparities 
Constant -1.90306 
(1.188433) 
-1.47513 
(0.957315) 
0.00521 
(0.003402) 
0.000744 
(0.002848) 
-1.02579 
(0.944656) 
DIND 2.209081*** 
(0.477073) 
1.948987*** 
(0.388341) 
-0.02886*** 
(0.005536) 
-0.00894** 
(0.003327) 
-2.06918** 
(0.75893) 
DUMMY -0.05936 
(0.324839) 
0.410375 
(0.389762) 
-0.00187 
(0.00209) 
-0.00617 
(0.003741) 
-0.12853 
(0.188612) 
ORGR 0.020578 
(0.75369) 
-0.29785 
(0.606119) 
-0.00416 
(0.005056) 
0.000578 
(0.003536) 
0.089017 
(0.160976) 
GRAD -0.00066 
(0.000874) 
-0.00094 
(0.000693) 
8.18E-09*** 
(7.72E-08) 
-2.58E-06 
(2.15E-06) 
 
R&Dexp/Y 84.0705*** 
(18.90605) 
121.4382*** 
(35.46077) 
   
GKF   -1.06E-05 
(3.09E-06) 
1.79E-08 
(5.79E-08) 
 
ED1     0.046612* 
(0.025724) 
R&DOCC   0.000438** 
(0.00015) 
 0.029631 
(0.017468) 
Capital/workers 0.128852 
(0.113122) 
0.162264 
(0.095701) 
  -0.01289 
(0.042228) 
PATENT   0.003972* 
(0.00204) 
0.003681** 
(0.001351) 
0.375336** 
(0.127849) 
FR  -0.01551* 
(0.008463) 
 0.000125** 
(4.67E-05) 
 
Adj. R 0.545795 0.613812 0.493968 0.586578 0.560127 
S.E. 0.492 0.454 0.003 0.002 0.253 
 
 
Table 12 shows that DIND positively affects innovation in terms of number of 
patents. In the second equation, relative to the first one, we add as a regressor the 
level of fraud. We notice that when this variable is included, the coefficient of the 
DIND decreases. A possible explanation might be that higher level of fraud could 
reduce trust within individuals by negatively affecting also the ability and the 
tendency of working together. Besides, considering all the equations we find that the 
level of fraud increases the level of expenditure in innovation.  
Equations 4 and 5 show that DIND negatively affects the expenditure in R&D. To this 
purpose we add another equation where the dependent variable captures the 
disparities in terms of investment in innovation that occurs across the regions. The 
result is that DIND is negative and significant in that regression as well. Regarding 
this variable we need to consider at least two elements. First, R&D expenditures, as 
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Ughettto points out (2006), is a variable difficult to be assessed, in particular when it 
is related to SMEs. In small firms innovation activities are often embedded in 
standard production processes or, more frequently, based on informal research or even 
delegated externally to the firms. Second, it is not always possible to confirm the real 
amount invested in research since in Italy R&D expenditures are not compulsorily 
reported in the balance sheet. Considering these two elements above mentioned and 
the negative relationship resulting from the regression between the DIND and the 
variable of innovation, a possible explanation might be the following. According to 
Saxenian (1996), the R&D sector is often dependent on informal exchange of 
intellectual property rights and informal training, simply because formal exchange 
would entail excessive transaction costs and slow down the speed of interchange. 
Where the level of cooperation and trust is higher, also the information flow (informal 
exchange a la Saxenian) is more intensive which may represent a different type of 
local resource for R&D. This local resource may offset the need of extra-expenditures 
in R&D (for instance training expenses). In simple words, by considering all the five 
regressions, higher ability to cooperate and higher capital of connections imply a 
higher level in innovation in terms of innovative products (patents) and a more 
efficient and trustworthy way of using money for R&D. 
Differently from De Clercq and Dakhli, in our regressions, it results that the 
associational activity is not significant either with respect to the number of patents or 
with respect to the investment in R&D over GDP. This result may reinforce Olson’s 
view about voluntary associations acting as special interest groups lobbying for 
preferential policies that impose disproportionate costs on society.   
Notice that in our regressions, either those relative to the labour economy or to 
innovation, the human capital variables (percentage of graduates GRAD and of people 
holding a diploma ED) have identical sign of the DIND but they are not significant. It 
seems that the labour market and the “innovation market” are not based on a 
“meritocratic” system. To this purpose the variables relative to the level of education 
might present two problems and therefore it might not be completely reliable. The 
first problem is that they might not represent a good proxy of human capital since 
they are not related to the percentage of workers. Knack and Keefer and other 
empirical works consider as potential human capital proxy the ratio between years of 
schooling over workers. We are considering, instead, people receiving a diploma or a 
degree over the residents. This is because it is very difficult to find this type of data at 
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the regional level.  The second problem, and probably the most significant one, is 
related to the interregional mobility of students which according to Emanuele Felice 
has grown quite notably during the last decades, in particular from the southern 
regions to the northern ones. This mobility is not taken into account in the data set. 
Actually if we try to analyse the disparities in terms of education relative to the 
residents we will see that the country is quite homogeneous. In the northern regions 
there are more people holding a degree but much more residents comparing to the 
southern regions. Because of this problem we may also think that the variable relative 
to the highest education (GRAD which indicates graduates) is even less reliable than 
the variable corresponding to people holding a diploma since interregional mobility is 
less likely to occur at the tertiary school rather than at the university level. This is 
probably one of the reasons why in the last regression on the innovation the variable 
relative to the tertiary school is significant while that one relative to graduates is not. 
It is true that in the third equation the variable GRAD is positive and significant but 
the coefficient is so low that its effect on the dependent variable will not be really 
influential. 
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7. Conclusions 
We have constructed a proxy (DIND) based on the density of active industrial 
districts members within each Italian region. 
As Putnam’s instrument, DIND is an aggregate proxy and, therefore, it is affected by 
two weaknesses points.  
First, it focuses mostly on a bottom-up approach. This means that it does not take into 
account institutional interventions able to modify or to change the stock of social 
capital inside the community. 
Second, it is not possible to distinguish inside the index the bonding from the bridging 
social capital (to this purpose, Sabatini, 2005, developed a model to separate the 
different forms of social capital and he applied the model to the Italian scenario). 
The last point is also one of the reasons that drive us to do not identify the DIND with 
the term “trust”. Actually, trust needs, first, to be identified (survey data on the level 
of trust like the World Value Survey), and then distinguished between its institutional 
and generalised side. From our data this attempt would be too ambitious and 
especially imprecise. From Markusen’s analysis of the Italianate industrial districts, it 
results that relations between local institutions and members of the ID take place 
through meetings and forums. This might intensify the interactions between the 
members and increase the probabilities of further collective actions. However, it is not 
possible to quantify the level of attendance with which those active vertical 
connections are used, as well as it will not be possible to precisely measure the 
frequency with which horizontal relations and interactions between members occur.  
Instead, the idea of our index is mainly based on the fact that inside an industrial 
district area, members communicate and interact frequently and connections are 
crucial. This attitude, according to the industrial district literature, fosters the level of 
trust inside the community. If we consider this scenario as the one belonging to our 
index, then the DIND might be identified as an alternative social capital proxy to 
those that already exist, at least with regard to the analysis of the economic situation 
across the Italian regions. 
Empirical result shows that our index together with the variable of associational 
activity significantly influences the labour economy from the unemployment rate 
perspective. Moreover, the proxy seems to affect also innovation in terms of 
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increasing the amount of innovative projects, ideas and products since it is 
significantly related to the number of patents. 
Further research will investigate the influence that this proxy might have on the well-
being across the Italian regions. In this case disparities in terms of income, life 
expectancy and economic resource constraints will represent the dependent variables 
that we will consider.       
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APPENDIX A 
Census 2001 
The Industrial Districts 
 
The industrial district is a local system characterised by the active co-presence of a 
human community and a dominant industry constituted by a set of small independent 
firms specialised in different phases of the same production process. 
This type of industrial system is part of the so called Local Labour System (LLS) 
 
LLS: territorial grouping of municipalities statistically comparable  
IDs are LLS that meet particular industrial concentration criteria. 
 
How to identify IDs   
The process used in the Census is based on three phases  
1) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing  
2) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing whose industrial economy is based on 
SMEs 
3) Identify the main industrial sub-sector (ex. textile) of these LLS 
4) Identify the IDs 
 
IDs Identification 
1) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing  
a) Compute the Concentration coefficient relative to the economic activity for each 
LLS 
 
totITAntotLLSn
atecoITAnatecoLLSn
,/,
,/,  
 
LLSn,ateco = workers in each economic activity in a LLS 
ITAn,ateco = workers in each economic activity in Italy 
ateco = economic activity 
LLSn,tot = total workers (in the good and service market) in a LLS 
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ITAn,tot = total workers (in the good and service market) in Italy 
  
b) Compare the LLS with a coefficient in the manufacturing industry higher than the 
national mean in order to derive the dominant economic activity. 
 
atecoITAntotITAntotLLSnatecoITAnatecoLLSn ,*)],/,(),/,[( −  
 
 If the highest coefficient is related to the manufacturing industry, then the LLS is 
mainly manufacturing 
 
2) Identify LLS mainly manufacturing whose industrial economy is based on SMEs 
Consider three dimensional classes of enterprises 
- Small size 0-49 workers  
- Medium size 50-249 workers 
- Big size over 249 workers 
 
Compute the coefficient for each dimensional class  
 
manITAnmanLLSn
manclassITAnmanclassLLSn
,/,
),(/),(  
 
LLSn(class),man = workers for each dimensional class in the manufacturing sector in 
the LLS 
ITAn(class),man = workers for each dimensional class in the manufacturing sector in 
Italy 
LLSn,man = workers in the manufacturing industry in a LLS 
ITAn,man = workers in the manufacturing industry in Italy 
 
 
 
3) Identify the main industrial sub-sector (ex. Textile) of these LLS 
a) Compute the coefficient relative to each sub-sector (The census identifies 10 
sub-sectors) 
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manITAnmanLLSn
subITAnsubLLSn
,/,
,/,  
 
LLSn,sub = workers in each sub-sector in a manufacturing LLS 
ITAn,sub =  workers in each sub-sector in Italy 
LLSn,man = workers in the manufacturing sector in a manufacturing LLS 
ITAn,man = workers in the manufacturing sector in Italy 
 
b) Compare the LLS with a coefficient greater than 1 in order to derive the 
dominant sub-sector. 
 
subITAnmanITAnmanLLSnsubITAnsubLLSn ,*)],/,(),/,[( −  
 
 
The highest coefficient identifies the sub-sector 
 
4) Identify the IDs 
Two conditions need to be satisfied 
a) The level of employment of small firms operating in the LLS specialised 
manufacturing activity must be greater than 50% of total employment in the 
same activity at the LLS level 
 
%50
_),(
_),( >
psubtotLLSn
psubsmeLLSn  
 
LLSn(sme),sub_p = workers in the principal sub-sector employed in the SMEs in a 
manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
LLSn(tot),sub_p = total workers in the principal sub-sector in a manufacturing LLS 
made by SMEs 
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b) In case there is only one medium companies in the clusters, then the number 
of the workers in the small companies has to be greater than the 50% of the 
number of the workers in the medium company (such that the industrial 
system is not polarised) 
 
%50
_),(
_),( >
psubmediumLLSn
psubsmallLLSn  
  
LLSn(small),sub_p = Workers for small companies in the main sub-sector in a 
manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
LLSn(medium)sub_p = workers for a medium company (when there is only one 
medium company in the industrial system) in a manufacturing LLS made by SMEs 
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APPENDIX B 
List of the Variables 
Associational Activity = Number of Voluntary Organisations over residents 
Capital/worker   
DIND = Number of industrial districts workers over number of workers in the Local 
Labour System 
ED = educational level (percentage of individuals holding a diploma) 
EXPORT 
FR = Level of fraud  
GKF = Gross Capital Formation 
GRAD = educational level (graduates) 
GRADLOSS = percentage of students that has left the university before the degree  
I = investment 
NMY = Net Import over GDP 
OCC = employment rate 
Patent = Aggregate number of patents over residents 
R&Dexp/Y = investment in R&D over GDP 
R&DOCC = percentage of workers in R&D 
UN1 = Youth Unemployment rate 
UN2 = Unemployment rate 
YAB = Income per capita 
YLU = Productivity of labour 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
